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Title: Weibo, framing, and media practices in China 
 
This study uses frames analysis to investigate online discourses and processes of political 
deliberation on China’s weibo (microblog) service. It offers a comparative analysis of 
competing discourses surrounding the case of Wang Yue, a toddler who was ran over by two 
motor vehicles in Foshan, following which eighteen people passed by and ignored her plight. 
The study aims to understand how weibo facilitate its users to express their differences and 
deliberate disagreements with each other. The study found that Internet users are rational in 
the sense that they do not simply lean towards a dichotomised choice of ‘pro-’ or ‘anti-’ 
official discourse, but they are able to negotiate their moral choices by considering a wide 
range of social and political factors in such an emotional and morally controversial incident.  
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Title: Weibo, framing, and media practices in China 
 
On 13 October 2011, a two-year-old girl Wang Yue (also known as Xiao Yueyue
1
) was hit by 
two motor vehicles in Foshan, a city in southern Guangdong province. Eighteen pedestrians 
passed but none offered assistance. She was later rescued by a garbage collector but died in a 
Guangzhou hospital seven days later. This entire scene was captured by the street 
surveillance camera; footage was released by news media and quickly circulated on the 
internet. According to reports the incident generated 45 million posts on Sina Weibo (CNN, 
2011), and 39.6 million search results on Baidu, China’s biggest Internet search engine.2 The 
incident provoked anger and condemnation of the two drivers and the eighteen pedestrians, 
and triggered nationwide debate about social morality. The incident also captured 
government attention. The Guangdong government launched an online consultation platform 
on its Sina Weibo account to canvas public opinion about potential legislation to punish those 
who refuse to help others in a public space (C. Zheng 2011).  
Despite the central government’s blocking of access to global social networking 
services (SNSs) such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, Chinese services such as Sina 
Weibo
3
 provide a relatively autonomous space to allow ‘deliberative discourses’ to take place. 
As Rosen (2010 p. 510) argues, despite government control, ‘the Internet community … will 
continue to find ways to circumvent and subvert government restrictions’. According to the 
China Internet Network Information Center’s (CNNIC) report (2013), the number of Internet 
users reached 564 million by December 2012 with a penetration rate of 42.1 %. The number 
of people using weibo surged 296% from 2010-2011, reached 309 million by the end of 2012. 
These figures seem to support Guobin Yang’s (2012) claim that the Internet has become 
integrated into Chinese people’s everyday lives.  
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Weibo was launched by Sina.com (one of China’s biggest online service providers) in 
2009. The weibo market in China is highly competitive; other major online providers, such as 
Netease, Tencent and Sohu have also launched their own weibo (Sullivan, 2012). Just like its 
global counterpart, Twitter, weibo users can share messages up to 140 Chinese characters, 
follow and ‘re-blog’ (retweet) others’ messages that they have found interesting.4  140 
Chinese characters can convey nuances and a great deal of information (Hu, 2011; Sullivan, 
2013).  
This essay uses frames analysis to investigate public communication on weibo related 
to the Wang Yue case. While many works in Chinese Internet studies applied ethnographic 
approach, textual analysis, and policy study, the technique of frame analysis allows us to 
understand the nature and dynamics of popular sentiments on China’s Internet. The concerns 
are: first, what are people doing in relation to this incident on weibo? Second, how do 
different frames compete and interact with each other? The argument has two parts. First, I 
argue that framing is inherently a process of political deliberation because to frame is to put 
forward an argument and a claim. To understand online frames is to understand the process of 
political deliberation in China.  Second, a deliberative framework is therefore more 
appropriate than a contentious or contestation approach to study China’s online politics.  
The essay proceeds in the following way: the first section provides a brief literature 
review of China’s online political communication and sets forth a framework that focuses on 
fragmented publics and social diversity. The second section examines the approach of frames 
and the process of framing in relation to the case study. The third section discusses the 
findings from the frame analysis.  
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China’s fragmented publics  
This section starts with the notion of the ‘public’ in Chinese media studies. A growing body 
of literature departs from the paradigm of state control versus online resistance; many authors 
recognise that state-public interaction is complex and subtle. As Haiqing Yu (2011) argues, 
the Chinese media system is no longer an organic whole that merely serves as the ‘tongue and 
throat’ for the Party; nor are the Chinese media audiences still the passive Mao-indoctrinated 
masses. In examining the transformation of Chinese media, Wanning Sun (2012, p. 14) also 
points out that ‘China’s television viewers were no longer a captive audience of CCTV’.5 
Instead, diverse reading and engagement with media text and the media technology (both 
online and mainstream) are taking place. This diversity relates to the concept of a fragmented 
society, a development that is intensified by China’s rapid but uneven process of 
marketisation. Sun and Chio (2012) argue that there are many Chinas within the PRC. Not 
only coastal regions enjoy early economic prosperity due to the reform prioritisation policies, 
but the unequal interregional economic capacities have induced large wave of population 
movements, from poorer rural countries to wealthier urban capitals. As Sun (2012, p. 18) 
argues, '"China" has already been "broken up"'.  
This social fragmentation and regional inequality translate into the uptake and 
penetration of digital media. As Damm (2007, p.284) sums up, ‘China’s Internet users are for 
the most part the winners of political reform: they are highly educated and live in the well-
developed urban regions in China’. This statement is contested by Jack Qiu (2009), whose 
empirical studies on China’s ‘information have-less’ expands the scope and breadth on our 
understanding of China’s network society. ICTs in China are not merely ‘toys’ for affluent 
groups, but they can assist working class and other marginalised social groups to address 
issues of their daily survival and enhance personal connectivity in their immediate 
environment (Qiu 2009, p. 197).  
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Online content and discourse are therefore determined by one’s past and immediate 
experience that are related to the broader social, economic, cultural and political context. 
Although the CCP devotes tremendous effort on building institutionalised online censorship 
to ensure unwarranted information outside the public discourse, the open and interactive 
features of the Internet can potentially turn itself into ‘an outlet for the undercurrent of 
ideological resistance to surface’ (Guo and Feng, p. 34). While some people use the Internet 
to express their concerns as members of China’s disadvantaged groups - such as AIDS 
patients (Yu, 2009) and hepatitis-B carriers (Yang, 2009), others use blogs to narrate their 
tragedy and daily lives; Chinese urban youth use the Internet to construct a ‘heterotopian 
third space’ to evade and resist the pressure and constraint from work and family (Liu, 2009); 
many use the Internet to criticise the current state of economic reform as social inequalities 
continue to soar  (Zhao,  2009).  
The diversity of online content reflects the fragmented and often competing values of 
Chinese society. These values are socially constructed and historically shaped. They reflect 
the continuous struggles over economic disparities, political beliefs, social recognition, and 
identity. By simultaneously appearing in the grand forum of weibo, each voice does not 
merely interact with the government; they also negotiate and intersect with each other, which 
constitute an important social force contributing to China’s online political dialogues.   
Instead of viewing these forces as a kind of ‘resistance culture’ from below, competing 
discourses are characterised by deliberation. Deliberation is more than a one-way process of 
putting forward a claim; it is also a reciprocal process of taking alternative views into 
consideration. There are two mechanisms at work simultaneously: one is between the publics 
and the state and one is among the publics, that is, between members of the publics. China’s 
publics, although fragmented, are highly inter-dependent on each other. This interaction 
composes a more holistic account to define China’s online sentiments. In order to illustrate 
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this argument, the concept of frames and therefore frames analysis offer a viable ground for 
investigation.  
 
Frames Analysis 
A frame is the way to organise and present information about social issues and controversy. It 
is the process of interpreting and expressing one’s subjective understanding in relation to 
one’s immediate environment. A frame is therefore not a holistic and objective interpretation 
of the world, but a partial interpretation of reality. As MacIntyre (2004, p. 152) argues, any 
claim of ‘truth’ is grounded on the ‘evaluative and normative principles of (one’s) particular 
standpoint’.  What one assumes to be a universal value can often be a local specific practice 
and belief. In discussing the moral argument of right and good, Qingping Liu (2010, p.246) 
also points out that, ‘what is viewed as “good” by some may be viewed as “evil” by others’.6 
MacIntyre’s and Q. Liu’s philosophical arguments parallel the principle of framing: one’s 
subjective way to organise, interpret and present information/view does not provide a holistic 
account of the issue at hand, although often people assume their framing of an issue has a 
universal application. It is precisely this ‘assumption’ that triggers competitions among 
frames.  A frame therefore is a means of communication, a way of interaction ‘to yield 
coherent ways of understanding the world’ (Reese 2003, p. 11). 
Many authors have discussed the techniques of framing analysis and the concept of 
frames across different disciplines. Zald (1996, p. 262) defines a frame as ‘the specific 
metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cues used to render or cast behaviour and 
events in an evaluative mode and to suggest alternative modes of action’. The Journal of 
Communication has produced a special issue on ‘Framing, Agenda Setting and Priming’ 
(2007, volume 57) to investigate the relationship between ‘media frames’ and ‘audience 
frames’. Simon and Xenos’s (2010) study provides a quantitative insight into America’s 
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major newspapers’ coverage of labor strikes and how deliberative discourse can come into 
being through different media representations.  
Although there are few scholars to date who have applied frame analysis in Chinese 
media studies, in other disciplines, frame analysis has been applied in Chinese political 
science and social movement study. For example, in Kevin O’Brien’s (2008) Popular Protest 
in China, William Hurst’s chapter of ‘Mass Frames and Worker Protest’ (2008), uses a 
regional approach (or what he calls the ‘structural roots of frames’) to investigate how the 
historical experience (socially and politically) of three different regions in China shape the 
framing of controversy during workers’ protests.  Feng Chen’s chapter of ‘Worker Leaders 
and Framing Factory-Based Resistance’ (2008) uses a historical approach to explore the 
‘political resource’ and ‘social root’ that workers’ leaders engage with (their experience 
during the Cultural Revolution) to frame their contention and choose tactics from the 
repertoire of contention. These studies have much to offer in applying framing analysis in the 
Chinese Internet studies, to understanding the diverse and competing online discourses. 
Two important themes emerging from these studies: first, a frame is socially 
constructed; and second, the relationship between frames is often competing in nature.  
Framing is not an isolated process, nor is it an independent variable that determines media 
output, political rhetoric, or sets the public agenda. On the contrary, frames are inherently 
social, they are shaped by what Van Gorp (2007, p. 63) calls the ‘macrostructure’: cultural 
identity, social institution, political system, and economic dynamic. Thus, framing analysis is 
useful because frames, in Van Gorp’s (p. 63) words, ‘constitute broader interpretative 
definitions of social reality’.  
Second, a frame cannot exist in isolation; it must interact with other frames to define 
itself and the issue at hand. This brings us back to the earlier section on MacIntyre’s 
discussion about ‘truth’. Through a framing perspective, it could be further argued that a so-
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called ‘truth’ can only come into being when different ways of interpretations are being 
expressed. This process of competitive framing therefore encourages and triggers deliberative 
processes in public communication. As Simon and Xenos (2000, p. 367) argue, ‘the framing 
of issues naturally proceeds through the same path in all deliberative settings. In the phases of 
deliberation, frames compete with each other to define the situation at hand’.  
There are two types of frames relevant to the discussion here. Reese (2007, p. 152) 
makes a distinction between a compelling frame and competing frames. A compelling frame 
of an incident is extremely difficult to be challenged, while competing frames reflect divided 
and fragmented public discourses over the subject of controversy. Reese (2007) uses the 
example of ‘war on terror’ during the post-9/11 years as a compelling frame and the example 
of abortion policy for competing frames, where vigorous debates are more obvious and open.  
In the case of China, a compelling frame can be one that comes from the top. The 
official political framing of China’s strong economic development and national sovereignty 
can be examples of compelling frames. This is not to say compelling frames are not contested, 
but they are difficult to be challenged openly and directly inside China. It is important to 
investigate the official compelling frame because popular discourses often emerged through 
the state’s official discourse. In a study of China’s Price Public Hearing Meetings (PPHMs), 
Shanruo N. Zhang (2013) illustrates that counter-hegemonic discourse from below is not 
entirely separated from the state’s hegemonic discourse: in order to ‘legitimise’ their counter-
hegemonic strategy, grassroots representatives on the PPHMs often ‘acknowledge the state’s 
authority and hegemony, yet simultaneously use non-threatening means … to create a new, 
more open forum beyond the parameters set by the hegemonic discourse’ (p. 144).  Building 
on Zhang’s observation, it is critically important to understand that competing frames can 
only exist when first, there is interaction with the compelling frame; and second there are 
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disagreements and differences between competing frames. The term ‘competing’ implies the 
processes of communication, deliberation, and consideration on China’s Internet.  
This ‘competition’ is amplified by digital media. In Pan and Kosicki’s (2003, p. 35) 
words, ‘we are in the age of “talk”’. The proliferation of interactive media such as the 
Internet blurs the distinction between news producers and consumers. Instead, when everyone 
can potentially be the news and information producer, distributor and consumer, a more 
interactive framework that focuses on the interplay, communication, and deliberation 
between social actors/groups is needed.  
The conceptualisation of competing frame shares the principle logic with political 
deliberation. As Simon and Xenos (2000, p. 637) points out, each frame ‘represents a 
contention or validity claim’. People in China do not only compete against the official 
discourse, but they also compete with each others’ discourses on the Internet. This 
competition, however, does not necessarily result in antagonistic social interaction, but by 
competing with each others’ framing, it helps to explore important social issues beneath the 
incident and thus enables public deliberation to go beyond the case.  
Therefore, I do not study ‘the media’ as I am not interested in how news media 
thematise the Wang Yue case. Nor do I merely focus on the government’s attempt to 
construct an official version of ‘social morality’ in China. Instead, I focus on how popular 
frames on the Internet are derived from and compete with the official frame and then interact 
with each other on weibo.  
 
Framing the death of Xiao Yueyue 
Let me briefly highlight the major controversies related to the case. The public debate over 
the death of Xiao Yueyue was highly emotional; anger against the two drivers and eighteen 
pedestrians dominated media reports. Commentators used terms such as ‘heartless’ and ‘cold-
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blooded’ to describe the apathy of drivers and the pedestrians on mainstream media and 
cyberspace. The Foshan Daily (2011) used a broad and large headline, ‘This day, they made 
Foshan ashamed!’ on its front page the day after the incident to condemn the ‘serious lack of 
social morality’.  
Social responsibilities and duties to others dominated public debate at the time. The 
bystander effect in this case, as many news media and online commentaries point out, linked 
to controversies of social responsibility in public spaces. One of the most referred to cases 
was the Peng Yu incident in 2006. Peng Yu, a 26-year-old student in Nanjing, helped an 
elderly lady who had fallen down on the street. Peng sent her to hospital and paid her modest 
medical expense. Instead of thanking him the old lady’s family accused Peng of causing her 
injuries and sued him for over ¥13,000 in medical expenses. The Nanjing Court found Peng 
guilty on the ground that ‘nobody pays a stranger’s medical expenses without a guilty 
conscience’ (Minter, 2012). Similar cases have taken place in China over the next few years. 
The debate over responsibilities and duties were framed within the legal controversy of these 
cases, where ‘helping’ can be deemed suspicious and can subsequently impact on ‘good 
Samaritans’. This context therefore induced diverse responses from the government, the 
media, and online publics. 
Then does the Xiao Yueyue incident have a compelling frame or many competing 
frames? From the mainstream media’s coverage and the government’s reaction, it seems like 
‘social morality in crisis’ was the ‘compelling frame’ at the time. But not only did the 
officially constructed ‘moral crisis’ frame fail to suppress the growth of competing discourses, 
the compelling frame encouraged the growth of competing frames on China’s Internet. The 
following paragraphs present the frame study and its findings.  
 
The Weibo poll 
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The frame analysis has the following concerns: first, what are the competing frames 
expressed on Weibo? Second, how are these competing frames different from the compelling 
frame? Third, how do they interact with each other? Extending from these concerns, the study 
aims to investigate whether this ‘frames interaction’ enable public deliberation over a morally 
controversial issue. 
I conducted a frames analysis of the comments on the Weibo poll launched by Foshan 
Daily. The poll was launched after the incident and closed on 23 October 2011. The polling 
question was ‘what would you do if you were those pedestrians?’: there were four choices 
and only one option could be selected: 1. Lift up the girl and rescue her; 2. Call 120 
(ambulance) or 110 (police) straight away; 3. Pretend you didn’t see her to avoid troubles; 4. 
Unclear, it’s too complicated. 142,445 people voted, and 1,451 threads of comments were 
posted on the polling page. Most people voted for option 2 (78.6%, 111,997 votes), and 
number 3 was the least chosen option (1.9%, 2,771 votes).  
Although the poll closed on 23 October 2011, the very last comment was posted on 20 
June 2012. The retrieved data did not generate exactly 1,451 threads as the polling page 
indicates, but 1,345 threads were collected. The rough 7% discrepancy between the two 
figures could be due to Weibo’s removal of spam or sensitive materials as Weibo 
acknowledges that it does not always display all the threads. My analysis anticipated that the 
actual retrieved threads are less than the number displayed on the polling page. The 7% 
difference however should not be statistically significant to interfere with the results. 
 
The compelling frame of ‘moral crisis’ 
As discussed, competing frames can only exist when there are disagreements with the broadly 
constructed compelling frame by mainstream media and government. This section briefly 
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highlights the compelling frame of the Xiao Yueyue incident by using the government’s 
responses.  
The government constructed a ‘China’s social morality in crisis’ frame. As mentioned, 
the Guangdong government reacted promptly to the incident by setting up an online hearing 
forum to take public views for possible legislation changes. Both of the provincial and central 
CCP leaders, such as the Party Secretary of Guangdong at the time, Wang Yang, and news 
director of the People’s Congress and China’s foreign affairs, Zhao Qizheng, issued strong 
criticism of China’s ‘bystander effects’ (Yangcheng Evening News, 2011; Beijing News, 
2012). Official media dedicated thorough coverage to ensure the incident received 
widespread public exposure. In fact, the set up of the studied Weibo poll reflects precisely the 
official framing of the incident. As the regional branch of state media, Foshan Daily’s poll 
attempts to limit the online discussion within the four options, which closely echoes the 
official framing of ‘morality in crisis’: the moral correctness entailed in the first two options 
contrasts with the other two options to scope public discussion within the dichotomised 
‘moral versus immoral’ choices.  
This was similar to crisis management in which morality is framed at the centre of the 
‘crisis’. This is not a new phenomenon in China. As Bakken (2000, p. 97) states, morality in 
China is about the ‘rules of proper conduct’, it is ‘drawing the boundaries and setting limits’ 
(p. 101). Tong (2011) also notes that morality has been a key source for a regime’s legitimacy 
throughout China’s long civilisation history, as it provides the basis for ‘the Mandate of 
Heaven’ (p. 146). The values of order and stability that morality entails are closely linked to 
the CCP government’s initiation of modernisation and economic reform (Bakken, 2000). 
Morality is then manifested to maintain the current political structure and the CCP’s political 
domination. In the case of Xiao Yueyue, morality is used as a framing device to first 
legitimise the CCP as an effective government; second, to shift public attention away from 
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the complex political and legal controversies of this case; and third, to move the 
responsibility to individuals and thus framing the incident as an ‘isolated’ one under the 
communist rule.  
The government framed the incident as an example of the retreat of altruistic sacrifice 
for the larger collective unit (nation, society, and the Party), the consequences of a society 
that departs from the CCP values and ideologies. In doing so the government provided a 
‘solution frame’ that urged Chinese people to stick with the CCP’s values and ideology. 
Wang Yang, for example, emphasised the importance of ‘learning from Lei Feng’ (Xue 
Leifeng) (Beijing News, 2012)
7
 to re-instate the so-called moral standard and social order. 
Two sub-frames subsequently emerged: the ‘Party is the solution’ and ‘effective governing’.   
 
Competing frames on Weibo 
In order to identify and interpret frames on Weibo, I have manually coded the online threads 
against a general question: what does each of the comments say about the Xiao Yueyue case? 
To help to further unpack this question I compare online discourses with the compelling 
frame: does the comment share the principle of the government’s compelling frame of moral 
crisis? Again, the underlying message of this frame is that individuals are to be blamed. This 
is not merely referring to those pedestrians and drivers, but also those people who would have 
chosen to ignore the dying girl in the same way (the Weibo poll has the option of ‘ignoring’).  
The first frame is thus ‘Individual Responsibility’ (‘Individual’ frame); there are 171 
threads (12.7%) in this frame. Comments in this frame largely support the principle of the 
compelling frame that individuals need to be more responsible to the society. They condemn 
individual pedestrians’ ‘ignoring’ (wushi) and the brutality of driving over the girl. Many 
comments in this frame use terms like ‘cold-blooded’, ‘heartless’, ‘coldness’ and ‘inhumane’ 
(mei renxing), which are used frequently in media’s framing. Moreover, comments in this 
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frame demand some forms of punishment or at least public apology from the pedestrians and 
drivers as a way to reconcile the ‘moral crime’ they have committed. The sense of 
individual’s social responsibility dominates the Individual frame. User Youran Siyu (14:22, 
21/10/2011) writes: ‘Don’t blame the society and don’t shift the responsibility to others, all of 
these are excuses’. Another user –array_baby (11:17, 21/10/2011) also writes, ‘the society 
didn’t make you guys (people who have chosen not to save the girl) apathetic, but it is YOU 
who have made this society so cold and scary’. Comments belonging to the Individual frame 
construct Xiao Yueyue’s death in a similar way to the government, aiming to reinforce a kind 
of moral correctness that is needed to be taken by every Chinese.   
Extending from the compelling frame, the second frame is ‘Rescue frame’. Comments 
belonging to this Rescue frame share the principle value with the compelling frame; that is, 
individuals bear responsibility to support social morality. However, the Rescue frame extends 
from the compelling ‘morality in crisis frame’ by engaging in the discussion of how to save 
the girl. This is an important question because as noted through the coding process, the mood 
of the Rescue frame changes over time. As people discuss more about the rescue method, 
they become more aware of the complexity and dilemma of ‘rescuing’ the girl, and become 
more sceptical about the value of the compelling frame. There are 445 threads (33.1%) 
belong to this frame.  
Unlike the first two frames, the third frame, ‘Social Responsibility’ frame (Society 
frame) expresses disagreement with the compelling frame. There are 341 threads (25.4%) in 
this frame and these comments do not share the fundamental principle that ‘individuals to be 
blamed’ with the compelling frame. Instead, comments in this frame often challenge the 
principle of the compelling frame by arguing that it was the government’s (both local and 
central) ‘responsibility’ instead of individuals because China’s law and regulation fail to 
protect the interests of ‘good people’ (hao ren).  
15  Weibo, framing, and media practices in China 
 
Additionally, a ‘Polling’ frame that focuses on the sincerity of the polling results was 
generated. The 102 threads (7.6%) in this frame direct their criticism against the Rescue and 
Individual frames: they question the sincerity of people who have chosen to help the girl as 
the Internet only offers a hypothetical situation. The Polling frame argues that social morality 
is about actual action being taken, not about nice verbal discussions (online and offline). 
Therefore, since individuals in China are powerless to make a difference, the practice of 
morality is subjected to China’s macrostructures which are guided by the state. It is 
effectively challenging the government’s attempt to restore moral order with the compelling 
frame. 
Finally, discourses within the ‘Expression’ frame display people’s emotional 
expression towards Xiao Yueyue, her family and the society, and people’s wishes for the 
future.  There is no clear indication of their views about the compelling frames and other 
frames, this frame nevertheless projects human emotion of this case. There are 227 threads 
(16.9%) belonging to this frame.  
 Around 10% of the threads are ‘replies’ to other threads (they are categorised within 
the above five frames in accordance to the contents of their replies), and 37 comments 
(2.75%) have explicitly stated that they have chosen option 3 or 4 (and they, too, are 
incorporated into the above five frames). 49 threads are ‘irrelevant’ as they are either 
publishing scams, duplicated threads, or contained no words (few threats only contained 
punctuations, such as ‘…’). These 49 threads were excluded from the study.   
 
Findings and discussions 
There are four observations that merit attention. First, none of the frames dominated the 
online discussion over the polling period. This is consistent with the earlier suggestion of 
China’s fragmented society. In relation to political deliberation, this competing nature helps 
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to define the situation at hand by providing diverse interpretations and views on the same 
incident. The practices of online voting and commenting facilitate this competing diversity as 
they allow Weibo participants to learn about opposing views and reason through online 
interaction—or at the very least these practices facilitate the environment to do so.   
Second, the competing frames extend the public discussion beyond the case itself, as 
Weibo participants negotiate their moral value and position by considering a broader range of 
social issues. These frames cannot be simply labelled as ‘pro-’ or ‘anti-’ government. As 
illustrated, both the Individual frame and Rescue frame (45.8%) accepts the principles of the 
compelling frame that individuals should be more responsible for helping others in the 
society. As a matter of fact, most comments in the other three frames also do not endorse the 
moral decision made by those pedestrians and drivers. However, accepting the principle of 
the compelling frame does not in any way suggest a ‘pro-government’ attitude online. In the 
Rescue frame for example, there is a great deal of questioning and concern over the issue of 
‘how to rescue’ in relation to China’s broader political, legal and social macrostructures.  
A further quantitative analysis of the Rescue frame is conducted by focusing on the 
reasons that Weibo users provided to justify their suggested rescue method, and 60.4% of 
them have done so. The most cited argument is medical concern, as many comments state, 
since Xiao Yueyue was ran over, her bones must be broken, then lifting her up could cause 
further damage to her body. Many Weibo users suggested calling police and ambulance. Yet, 
there are also comments opposing these suggestions, because problems like traffic congestion 
in China might seriously delay the valuable time of rescuing. Few even express scepticism 
about the responsiveness and effectiveness of Chinese police and ambulance.  
Furthermore, about 18% of comments in this frame mentioned terms like ‘photograph’ 
or ‘recording’ in the process of rescuing so that the rescuer can have ‘evidence’ to avoid 
being wrongly accused for the girl’s injury. These comments reflect Weibo users are well 
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aware of the potential injustice of China’s legal system (as reflected through the Peng Yu 
case), and this is one of the most commonly referred arguments in the Society frame. While 
the Rescue frame accepts the principle of the compelling frame, there is little to suggest that 
they share the government’s underlining messages of ‘effective governing’ and ‘Party is the 
solution’.  
Chinese Internet users are ‘rational’ in the sense that they do not easily lean towards the 
dichotomy of pro- or anti-official in such highly emotional incidents. Instead, they negotiate 
their own moral standing through considering the principle and value of other frames in 
relation to the broader macrostructures in China.  Both the practice of voting and commenting 
thus provide the opportunity for Weibo users to situate themselves within an imaginary moral 
position (one that was encountered by the drivers and pedestrians), where self-interest versus 
collective moral value conflict and confluent.  
  Third, instead of producing a ‘public consensus’, the online poll extends Weibo users’ 
engagement for ongoing deliberative dialogue. 49% of Weibo users stated that they are not 
satisfied with the polling result.
8
 The high dissatisfaction rate effectively rejects the notion of 
‘majority rule’ and it reflects a relatively strong, critical and independent political culture on 
China’s Weibo. 
Although the setup of the online poll effectively limited public discussion into four 
choices (which is highly moral-focused), the Weibo discussion has gone beyond such 
boundary and even question the value of such polling systems in triggering public debate. 
The Polling frame for example questions the sincerity of the polling result. Some comments 
there focuses on the ‘statistics-reality gap’: although more than 80% of people choose to 
rescue the little girl (option 1 and 2 combined) on Weibo; in reality only the old lady saved 
the child. The discourse of the Rescue frame supports Gutmann and Thompson’s (2004, p.6) 
suggestions that deliberation is an open, ongoing process that it does not ‘presuppose that the 
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decision at hand will in fact be justified’ but ‘citizens can criticise previous decisions and 
move ahead’. Instead of producing a so-called ‘public consensus’ through the aggregated 
voting results, the practice of commenting enables Weibo users to exercise their power to 
question an aggregated decisional outcome. While voting helps to recreate an imaginary 
moral situation to stimulate critical consideration of the situation; commenting helps Weibo 
users to learn to criticise and question the so-called moral choices in the case. Many Weibo 
users recognise the moral dilemma and difficulties within China’s political context that in a 
real life situation, decisions cannot be made so easily; instead, it is rather understandable to 
be puzzled, to be shocked, and even to walk pass.  
 Fourth, if each of these frames represents a public based on the circulation of opinions, 
China’s diverse online publics are developed and defined by what Warner (2002) calls the 
‘strangers-hood’. Again, a competing frame does not merely compete against the state-
orientated compelling frame, but it is competing vigorously with other competing frames. 
Although only 10% of the threads are direct replies to others’ comments, the main online 
frames are developed upon disagreements (for example, the Individual and Society frames 
are explicitly disagreeing with each other). While Warner (2002, p. 56) is right to argue that 
‘reaching strangers is [a public’s] primary orientation’, and ‘a public might almost be said to 
be a stranger-relationality in a pure form’. But the interaction between self and others, 
between competing frames is not simply about ‘seeking commonality’ that unites strangers, 
because this comes later. Instead, competing frames can only exist when each of them insists 
on its moral principle. In other words, competing frames and thus political deliberation can 
only take place when there are disagreements and each individual insists on them. It is this 
‘insistence’ that generates competition and deliberation. The practices of voting and 
commenting manifest these disagreements and reinforce the sense of insistence, to provoke 
and encourage its members to put forward their claims and arguments. During this process 
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they encounter disagreements which provide alternative views on the same controversy. As 
different frames each depicts a partial interpretation of the Wang Yue case, this fragmented 
online dynamic provides the environment that helps Weibo users to witness differences and 
learn about alternative views. The symbolic representations of online voting and commenting 
help to crystallise the deliberative sentiments among Weibo users. 
  
 
Concluding remarks 
The idea of political deliberation, as Dryzek (2006, p. 28) argues, is about ‘participants try to 
understand and recognize the legitimacy of the positions held by their opponents’. Instead of 
‘negotiating’, voting offered an opportunity for Weibo users to place themselves into the 
position held by the eighteen ‘heartless and cold blooded’ pedestrians to understand and 
recognise their moral situation at the time. Commenting allows Weibo users to experience 
and interact with alternative (and often different) views and perspectives and to position 
one’s moral values within these disagreements.  
Throughout the processes of voting and commenting, many Weibo users confessed that 
they, too, were confronted with a moral dilemma. This moral dilemma, as many have pointed 
out, is caused by a range of social issues and legal concerns as discussed. Whether or not 
Weibo users’ polling choices were the true reflection of their consciousness becomes 
irrelevant as the poll facilitates participation and public dialogue, and encourages diverse 
views and values being expressed openly. 
This online participation however, does not necessarily deliver a public consensus as 
such. Instead, as the case study shows, political deliberation takes place at the very point 
where disagreements and opposing moral values are amplified in cyberspace. The competing 
values and ideologies become the focal and departure points for deliberations: disagreements 
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and differences in framing the incident trigger the process of serious and critical self-
reflection (fanxing) of duties and responsibilities, self and others in China.  
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Notes 
 
1
 Xiao literately means ‘little’ and ‘small’ in Chinese. Chinese often use this prefix to describe young child.  
2
 Keywords search the Chinese characters, Xiao Yueyue Shijian (Little Yueyue Incident), search done on 17 
October 2012. 
(http://www.baidu.com/s?wd=%E5%B0%8F%E6%82%A6%E6%82%A6%E4%BA%8B%E4%BB%B6&pn=0
&ie=utf-8&usm=3).  
3
 Weibo with a capital letter ‘W’ refers to Sina Weibo; where weibo with a lower case ‘w’ refers to weibo 
services in China in general. 
4
 As this paper is being written up, services such as Sina Weibo continue to launch new functions and features. 
During the writing process, a ‘LIKE’ button (as on Facebook) has been introduced. Weibo in China is more a 
converged version of Facebook and Twitter than simply a Chinese version of Twitter.   
5
 CCTV – China Central Television network;  
‘Transformation’ here refers to the media reform that commercialise Chinese media (especially local media 
sectors) from a state-subsidised entity to a self-financed entity since 1990s.  
6
 Q. Liu (2010, p. 246) provides the example of ‘universal impartial love’ (jian’ai), which is ‘the most desirable 
good in human life’ in accordance to Moism, but for Confucianism, ‘it is “beastly” and blameworthy evil in the 
moral sense’.  
7
 Lei Feng (1940-1962) was a communist solider and was being portrayed as a social role model of an altruistic 
self by the CCP. His selfless image and stories have been promoted and inserting into school text books across 
China over the years. For detail discussion on morality and modelling in China, see Bakken (2000, pp. 179-200) 
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8
 This is the result from a separate poll that is attached with the Foshan Daily’s poll. Sina Weibo sets up a 
subordinate poll to seek people’s view on the original polling outcomes and set ups. 
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